https://pwq.bou.ac.ir/ Theosophia Practica en daily 1 Fri, 20 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0330 Fri, 20 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0330 https://pwq.bou.ac.ir/article_79757.html Some analytical philosophers, such as Russell and Wittgenstein I, believe that to overcome the problems of mentalism, descriptive phrases in propositions referring to the external world must end in a term in the subject area that refers to its object outside without evoking any meaning in the mind and directly (Logical Atomism). Demonstrative pronouns and proper nouns play such a role in the realm of vocabulary. In agreement with them, Donlan, Putnam, and Kripke also proposed the causal theory of reference; Kripke believes that this kind of denotation is not specific to particular things, but also applies to the reference of common nouns to types of beings in the physical world, and provides reasons for his claim. This article first explains the most important reasons for this theory using a descriptive-analytical method and after criticizing them, presents the view of Islamic philosophy on the topic of "naming" with emphasis and inspiration from the ideas of Allamah Mesbah Yazdi. This approach, by analyzing the construction quality of particular (juz'ī) and essential concepts, concludes that the transfer through demonstrative pronouns and names is not fundamentally a direct transfer, but is facilitated through the representation of aforementioned concepts. The important implications of each of these two perspectives will also be examined. https://pwq.bou.ac.ir/article_79509.html Avicenna restricts the acceptance of "modalities" (jiha, pl. juhāt) to conditional propositions connected (muttaṣila) and considers their application in disjunctive (munfaṣila) propositions invalid. Given the fundamental role of modality in analyzing the truth, permanence, and necessity of propositions, Avicenna's position creates a significant theoretical gap: if disjunctive propositions, like connected ones, have quantifiers (sur), why can't they possess modalities? This article highlights this contradiction and pursues two central questions: First: Why, from Avicenna's perspective, cannot "contradiction" and "coincidence" be considered modalities of disjunctive propositions? Second: Why do the well-known modalities of "necessity," "permanence," and "possibility" not have the capacity to be applied to disjunctive propositions?While the scholar Tusi (Khwaja Naṣīr al-Din Ṭūsī) offers a vague response by accepting the lack of modalities in disjunctive propositions, this research demonstrates that a more precise answer depends on two fundamental foundations in Avicenna's thought: his specific understanding of the nature of a disjunctive proposition and the reality of "disjunction" in contrast to Al-Farabi, and the denial of a real distinction between necessity and permanence. Based on this, the article argues that none of the four well-known modalities can be applied in a disjunctive proposition; consequently, the division of disjunctive propositions into "with modality" (muwajjiha) and "absolute" (muṭlaqa) is invalid from Avicenna's perspective. https://pwq.bou.ac.ir/article_79336.html This paper examines the evidence for the correspondence between the four levels of knowledge and the four levels of existence. To achieve this, the author first elucidates the four levels of knowledge based on a narration from Imam al-Ṣādiq (AS). This contributes significantly to a deeper understanding of religious texts (scriptures) and the discovery of their ontological aspects. Religious texts, while demonstrating the path of guidance, also reveal the reality of the world to humans. Neglecting this point leads to a superficial understanding of religious texts and deprives rational sciences of an inspiring source for thought. As it will be shown, in this narration, the Kaaba, the Bayt al-Maʿmūr, the Throne (ʿArsh), and the fourfold glorifications (tasbīḥāt arbaʿ) are introduced as symbols of a religious rite (Hajj). Three of these levels exist in the supramaterial realm. Similarly, there are three immaterial worlds in the four levels of existence. The content found in rational sciences regarding the four levels of existence exhibits a striking similarity to the descriptions of religious teachings concerning the Bayt al-Maʿmūr, the Throne, and so on. https://pwq.bou.ac.ir/article_79483.html Within the realm of religious knowledge, the use of demonstrative reason (ʿaql burhānī) to understand lofty concepts is not possible for all individuals; for most people are connected to the sensible world and influenced by imaginative forms. Accordingly, the faculty of imagination, as the focal point of human emotions, plays an important role in religious knowledge as a starting point (not a peak point) in the attention of divine prophets, through imitation (muḥākāt), creativity, and representation (lit. portraiture) in transforming the sensible into the intelligible and vice versa. Examining the verses of the Holy Qur'an and the traditions of the Infallibles (AS) also reveals that the Qur'an and the Ahl al-Bayt (AS) have utilized this method to instill religious knowledge in the hearts of audiences and followers. This has led to the discussion of the imitative role of the faculty of imagination and the prophet's special imagination as valuable topics in Islamic wisdom in the process of analyzing the nature of revelation, the prophet's connection with the angel of revelation, and the quality of communication with the people. This article, through an analytical examination of religious sources and Islamic wisdom, elucidates the rational role of imagination in propagating religious knowledge from the perspective of Islamic wisdom. https://pwq.bou.ac.ir/article_78856.html Conflict takes shape in the form of strife and crisis between the internal forces of human beings within the realm of Plato's anthropology. The central question of this paper is to assess the relationship between internal strife of the forces with knowledge and ethics, considering the conceptual possibilities of Plato's philosophy. It then proposes a novel formulation of this strife in the form of a duality of "ideal and actual conflict" and presents the different consequences of each type. This research, employing a descriptive-analytical approach, seeks to answer the central question: under what conditions does internal strife transform into ideal or actual conflict? The findings indicate that the outcome of the strife determines the type of conflict. When desire or will impose themselves on other forces, directing the soul towards the sensible world, it constitutes an actual conflict. In this strife, other forces are eliminated, and the effort is to preserve existence (baqāʾ). However, if reason, based on wisdom and by appeasing other forces, directs them towards the World of Forms (ʿĀlam al-Muthul), then this constitutes an ideal conflict, and its consequence is the harmony of human forces in movement towards exalted existence.  Happiness lies in the management of the strife of the soul's forces by reason and its transformation into an ideal conflict. https://pwq.bou.ac.ir/article_79447.html The Principle of Oneness, as a fundamental principle in explaining causality and the emanation of existence, necessitates the impossibility of the emanation of multiplicity from a single, inherently unified being This is because such emanation would require multiple qualities and distinct determinations in the originating agent, which contradicts the absolute unity of the essence of the necessary existent. Throughout history, this principle has had both proponents and opponents Philosophers such as Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā) and Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī considered the Principle of Oneness to be self-eident and in accordance with the innate nature of reason. In contrast, theologians such as al-Mufid and al-Ghazali, citing the absolute transcendence of the divine essence and the unity of divine actions, rejected the principle and justified the emanation of multiplicity be equating the divine action's relationship with all possibilities and denying the preference of the arbitrary.This research, employing a descriptive-analytical method with a comparative and critical approach and utilizing library resources, first elucidates the concept of Oneness, then examines the most important views of proponents and opponents of this principle, critiques them in certain instances, and ultimately emphasizes the perspective of Mulal Sadra (Mullā Ṣadrā) and his innovations in this field. According to this research, the origin of the denial of the Principle of Oneness lies in the lack of a correct understanding of the true unity and simplicity of the essence of the necessary existent. The preferred view is that of Mulla Sadra, who, by elevating the explanation of Oneness to a theophany-based approach and conceiving emanation as a manifestation of the existence of the simply true (Basīṭ al-Ḥaqīqah), constructs a coherent system that is both in line with rational proof and compatible with mystical intuition. In this perspective, multiplicity does not negate unity but is rather a level of determination of the single truth. The relationship between the one and the many is not one of lateral opposition but of longitudinal manifestation in the course of existence.