Recently a view has been presented against traditional theory of mental being. According to this view mental existence of quiddities in representational knowledge is negated and a distinction is made between meaning and referent as absolute essential object of knowledge and qualified object of knowledge respectively and separate from concept which is identified as representational knowledge. Such distinctions in this view give rise to fundamental changes in epistemological as well as ontological views. The present article is to give a critical review of the view in question. To begin with, no argument has been provided for the distinction made between essential object of knowledge and representational knowledge. Moreover, the implications of distinguishing meaning from concept, referent and reality are incompatible.
Morvvat, A. (2016). Critical Review on Epistemological and Ontological Implications of Distinction of Meaning from Concept, Referent and Reality. Theosophia Practica, 8(Issue 28), 149-171.
MLA
Morvvat, A. . "Critical Review on Epistemological and Ontological Implications of Distinction of Meaning from Concept, Referent and Reality", Theosophia Practica, 8, Issue 28, 2016, 149-171.
HARVARD
Morvvat, A. (2016). 'Critical Review on Epistemological and Ontological Implications of Distinction of Meaning from Concept, Referent and Reality', Theosophia Practica, 8(Issue 28), pp. 149-171.
CHICAGO
A. Morvvat, "Critical Review on Epistemological and Ontological Implications of Distinction of Meaning from Concept, Referent and Reality," Theosophia Practica, 8 Issue 28 (2016): 149-171,
VANCOUVER
Morvvat, A. Critical Review on Epistemological and Ontological Implications of Distinction of Meaning from Concept, Referent and Reality. Theosophia Practica, 2016; 8(Issue 28): 149-171.
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