The Theory of Meaning in Transcendent Theosophy (Ḥikmat Muta'āliyah)

In the first half of the twentieth century, the dominant approach in Western philosophy gradually shifted from an ontological stance to an epistemological one, and subsequently to a linguistic stance. Analytic philosophers—including Frege, Russell, and Carnap—believed that many traditional philosophical problems arose from linguistic misunderstandings. Consequently, rather than addressing existence itself, they examined the language expressing it. Theories of meaning, particularly referential, pragmatic, and pictorial theories, sought to demonstrate how propositions could possess meaning and thus be true or false. This transformation led to traditional debates about existence and its attributes being supplanted by discussions about meaning. However, within the tradition of
Islamic philosophy—specifically in Mullā Ṣadrā’s Transcendent Theosophy (Ḥikmat Muta'āliyah)—a distinct approach is observed. By advancing the theory of the "Primacy
of Existence" (Aṣālat al-Wujūd) and the "Conventionality of Quiddity" (I'tibāriyyat Māhiyyah), Ṣadrā fundamentally regards existence as the ontological foundation and quiddity as conventional (accidental and metaphorical). On this basis, he asserts that
the external realization of any meaning—whether literal or non-literal—is not merely impossible but incorrect. He contends that meaning is solely a mental form (ṣūrat dhihniyyah), residing not in external objects but in the mind of the cognitive agent. Accordingly, this research aims to define the theory of meaning, briefly outline Western theories of meaning, and answer the following questions: What constitutes the theory of meaning in Transcendent Theosophy? Can this theory address criticisms leveled against theories of meaning? While rejecting the direct realism of meanings, Ṣadrā provides a more precise explanation of how meanings are perceived and communicated. Relying on principles such as the intrinsic veridicality of knowledge (kāshifiyyat dhātiyyat 'ilm), the reduction of acquired knowledge to presential knowledge, and the union of the soul and body (ittiḥād nafs wa jism), he presents a comprehensive and coherent account of the process of mental signification. Thus, his theory approximates a "conceptualist theory of meaning," yet differs in that it avoids criticisms directed at Western empirical and analytic theories—such as the mind-language dichotomy or the abstraction of meaning. From this perspective, Ṣadrā’s theory is not only rooted in a robust ontology but also capable of explaining literal meaning and human knowledge. Indeed, the Ṣadrian approach—grounded in the unity of existence (waḥdat wujūd), presential knowledge ('ilm ḥuḍūrī), and the mind-dependence of meaning—offers a distinct yet profound path for understanding meaning, which may serve as a complement or even a critique of meaning theories in modern analytic philosophy.