A Critical Analysis of Martyr Motahhari’s View on Innate (Takwīnī) and Conventional (Iʿtibārī) Rights

Today, the belief in “rights” constitutes one of humanity’s fundamental convictions in the realm of social relations and the international arena, to the extent that modern man has dubbed his own era “the age of rights” and regards himself as inherently entitled. For contemporary man, it is not sufficient that an issue merely lead to his welfare; rather, only the attainment of his rights can bring him peace of mind. Thus, the question of rights has become one of the most significant concerns of modern human life. Islam—particularly the Noble Qur’an—whose “truthfulness” is among the most important characteristics of its beliefs, teachings, and rulings, also lays great emphasis on the matter of rights. One important discussion in the study of rights is their division into innate (takwīnī) and conventional (iʿtibārī) rights. This classification has been addressed by both Islamic and Western thinkers, many of whom have expressed their own perspectives on it. Among these, Martyr Murtadha Motahhari, as one of the prominent contemporary Islamic scholars, examined the issue in detail and with great attention. Believing in both innate and conventional rights, he offers a distinctive and thought-provoking definition of each. This study, through a precise and structured examination of Motahhari’s works on the subject of rights, elucidates his views on innate and conventional rights and, ultimately, subjects them to critique. The principal question of this research is to assess the validity of Motahhari’s definitions of innate and conventional rights, and this has been pursued using a descriptive-analytical method. Motahhari presents multiple definitions of “right.” According to one definition, a right is a special relation between entities, such as between human beings and other beings, and this relation is the particular authority (ikhtiyār) possessed by the right-holder. This authority is either innate or conventional; accordingly, rights are divided into innate and conventional. In Motahhari’s view, an innate right arises from a teleological relation, whose purport is the innate authority, permission, and capacity of beings to attain perfection—such that beings are created in a manner that endows them with the authority and capacity to reach their appropriate perfections. A conventional right, by contrast,
is a non-real authority that a person—for example, over an object—possesses, which is instituted and established by law within the context of society. Clearly, the result of this authority is the benefit enjoyed by the right-holder. However, this view is subject to critique on several grounds. On one hand, it is unclear whether Motahhari considers the use of the term “right” in its various meanings to be a case of conceptual unity (ishtirāk maʿnawī) or merely verbal homonymy (ishtirāk lafẓī), since certain of his statements imply the former while others imply the latter. On the other hand, Motahhari regards a right as a special relation between two entities, such that if the relation exists, the right exists, and if
it does not, the right does not. Yet, defining a right as a relation between two entities presupposes, first, the actual existence of those two entities, and second, the existence of a relation between them, such that only then can the right be realized. This analysis appears problematic, for a right is in fact a privilege possessed by the right-holder, and the realization of this privilege does not necessarily require the existence of two entities and
a relation between them—for example, God’s right of creation, which is a privilege belonging to Him and which He possessed even prior to the creation of other beings. Furthermore, restricting innate rights solely to teleological relations seems unfounded, as innate rights can also be conceptualized in terms of causal agency; for example, the relation between God and His creatures is a causal one, wherein God is the agent and the ontological cause of the creatures’ existence, and the creatures are His act, with all their aspects dependent upon Him and having an innate exclusivity to Him. This ontological exclusivity necessarily entails God’s innate right of disposition over His creatures, in the mode of causal agency. In sum, Motahhari’s view on innate and conventional rights suffers from various deficiencies and requires further refinement.