نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسنده
استادیار، موسسه آموزشی و پژوهشی امام خمینی، قم، ایران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
The doctrine of the primacy of existence (aṣālat wujūd) and the mentality of quiddity (iʿtibārīyat māhīyyat) is among the most critical discussions in Islamic philosophy, forming the foundation of numerous issues in Transcendent Theosophy (ḥikmat mutaʿāliyah) and demarcating a boundary between Islamic and Western philosophers. Its formulation as a cornerstone of Islamic philosophy is one of the groundbreaking achievements of Ṣadr Muta’allihīn (Mulla Sadra). Contemporary interpretations of Ṣadra’s primacy of existence diverge significantly. Some hold that quidditative concepts (mafhūm māhūwī) are truly and intrinsically applicable to external reality (wāqiʿ khārijī), considering external reality itself to be of the nature of quiddity (sankh māhīyyah). They affirm both the true applicability of quidditative concepts to the external world and the objective reality of quiddity, without seeing this as incompatible with the mentality of quiddity. Others reject both the objective reality of quiddity and even the true applicability of quidditative concepts to external reality. A third group denies the objective reality of quiddity but accepts that quidditative concepts are truly and intrinsically applicable to external reality. Thus, some regard quiddity as the limit of existence (ḥadd wujūd), others as a mental abstraction (taṣawwur wa khayāl wujūd), and still others as identical to existence itself (ʿayn wa matn wujūd). This study examines the objectivist interpretation (tafsīr ʿayniyyat) of quiddity—wherein existence is compared to quiddity, and the attributes of existence are ascribed to quiddity—and investigates one of its underlying premises: the differentiation between meaning (maʿnā), concept (mafhūm), and referent (miṣdāq). The study employs a descriptive-analytical method to clarify Ṣadra’s doctrine of the primacy of existence and critiques
the objectivist interpretation. Key findings include: 1. The term “existent” (mawjūd) is common to two usages: (1) true applicability (ṣidq bi dhāt) and (2) external reality (huvīyyat khāriji). According to the primacy of existence, while mawjūd in the first sense applies to quiddity, mawjūd in the second sense does not—yet both usages apply to existence. 2. The objectivist interpretation conflates these two meanings, erroneously concluding that quiddity is externally real (mawjūd bi maʿnā thānī), whereas quiddity’s proper domain is the mind (dhihn). Its thingness (shayʾīyyat) is conceptual, serving only to represent external reality (ḥikāyah ʿan wāqiʿ khārijī). Its relation to reality is limited to true applicability and union with it (ittiḥād bih), not being identical to it (ʿayn wāqiʿ). 3. The distinction between concept, meaning, and referent is invalid, as meaning is not the referent but rather the concept itself. Their differentiation is purely notional (iʿtibārī). 4. Even within the objectivist framework, this distinction fails, because meaning (maʿnā) refers back to the referent (miṣdāq) and cannot be considered independent of it. 5. A concept (mafhūm), qua universal (kullī), has a representational aspect (ḥaythīyyat ḥākiyyah), but qua instantiated in an external, individual existent (mawjūd ʿaynī shakhṣī), it is always what is represented (maḥkī ʿalayh). The objectivist interpretation erroneously treats these two aspects as separate.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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