خوانش ملاصدرا از فخر رازی در نفی ماهیت از واجب

A philosopher’s or school’s engagement with rival viewpoints serves as an indicator of their intellectual depth and a measure of their strength in confronting alternative theories. Extracting and analyzing such readings is not only pedagogically valuable but also a research imperative for advancing philosophical discourse and discerning superior arguments. Among the pivotal philosophical topics—central to both general metaphysics (umūr ‘āmmah) and theology (ilāhiyyāt bi ma‘nā akhaṣṣ)—is the discussion of the attributes (aḥkām) of the Aseity Being (Wājib Ta‘ālā). This study explores Mulla Sadra’s (Ṣadr Muta’allihīn) critique of Fakhr Din Razi’s (Fakhr Rāzī) position on attributing quiddity (māhiyyah) to the AseityBeing. The central research question is: How does
Mulla Sadra—as a proponent of the doctrine of “negating quiddity from the Aseity”
(nafy māhiyyah ‘an Wājib)—interpret and respond to Razi’s objections against this philosophical tenet? Adopting a descriptive-analytical method, the findings reveal that Mulla Sadra regards the Aseity as pure existence (‘ayn wujūd), utterly transcendent beyond quiddity, whereas Razi asserts that the Divine Reality is a quiddity (māhiyyah) contingently paired with existence. Sadra systematically refutes Razi’s stance using principles such as the simplicity of the Aseity (basāṭat Wājib) and the impossibility of a thing’s precedence over itself (imtinā‘ taqaddum shay’ ‘alā nafsih). He further dismantles Razi’s objections, which stem from the latter’s engagement with Peripatetic (mashshā’ī) metaphysics. Notably, Razi critiques the negation of quiddity doctrine without explicitly defending his own primacy of quiddity (aṣālat māhiyyah) framework, instead leveraging Peripatetic presuppositions about existence and quiddity. Mulla Sadra’s reading culminates in a rigorous rebuttal (radd) of Razi’s four ontological (wujūdī) and epistemological (ma‘rifī) objections, extending even to Razi’s strongest epistemic argument for affirming quiddity. A comparative analysis demonstrates Sadra’s mastery of the subject’s intellectual history and his adept use of sound principles. The study further proposes responses—rooted in Sadra’s methodology—to two additional objections from Razi that Sadra did not explicitly address. Ultimately, the inadequacies (nāqisiyyah) of Razi’s position derive from his adherence to primacy of quiddity (versus Sadra’s primacy of existence, aṣālat wujūd), his neglect of
the gradation of existence (tashkīk wujūd), and his conflation of conceptual (mafhūmī)
and referential (miṣdāqī) levels of existence. Sadra’s Transcendent Philosophy (Ḥikmah Muta‘āliyah) resolves these gaps, offering a comprehensive critique that bridges ontological and epistemological dimensions. His foundational responses effectively patch the logical fissures in the Peripatetic arguments against attributing quiddity to the Aseity.