وحدت نفس در انسان؛ بررسی انتقادی نظریه استاد فیاضی درباره نفس انسان در پرتو «نظریه صدرالمتألهین»

The forms that inhere in matter (hayūlā) are arranged hierarchically, since it is impossible to suppose that an elemental form could inhere in matter prior to the corporeal form. Hence, in the order of forms, the corporeal form appears first, followed by the elemental form, and then the mineral form; each possesses distinctive effects different from the preceding one. However, every new form that appears after a previous one also encompasses the effects of the earlier form. Thus, each subsequent form is more complete than the former and, at the same time, more complex, as it includes the preceding composition—until it reaches a level of complexity that is termed the “soul” or “psychic form,” distinguished from previous forms by its vital characteristic (growth, sensation, speech, and intellect). Among the central topics in philosophical anthropology is the problem of the human soul. Numerous issues have been raised concerning the soul—one of which is whether a human being possesses one single soul or multiple souls. This question is usually discussed under the topic of successive, hierarchical forms (ṣuwar ṭūlī mutarākib) within the same matter. It is also debated whether the actualization of a new form eliminates the previous one or whether the earlier form remains subordinate to
the new. According to Ibn Sīnā, elemental forms—whether simple or composite—are always “forms,” but according to Mullā Ṣadrā, these forms are actual as forms only in individuation, while in composition they exist as potential. Therefore, from Ṣadrā’s perspective, every existent has only one actual form at a time. This issue manifests most prominently in discussions of the soul, where nearly all Islamic philosophers have expressed distinct views. Some have affirmed the multiplicity of souls in man, while others have maintained the unity of the human soul. The question arises: does each individual human possess a single soul from which all actions emanate, or multiple souls, each being the source of actions related to itself? Among the ancient philosophers, Plato held that the human being possesses multiple souls, whereas philosophers such as al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, and Mullā Ṣadrā affirmed that each individual possesses one single soul, though it operates through distinct faculties (quwā). Mullā Ṣadrā regarded this dependence on faculties as
the defining feature of the soul, yet he considered the soul to have gradational levels of existence, asserting that the soul itself is the source of all diverse actions and functions, and that it is, by itself, “the totality of the faculties” (al-nafs kull al-quwā). From his viewpoint, since the soul possesses various degrees of existential intensity, there is no need for the theory of multiple faculties to explain diverse functions and effects. Although he discusses two theories—multiplicity of faculties and gradation of the soul—he ultimately accepts the latter, maintaining that the origin of all different effects lies within the degrees of the soul itself. Among contemporary philosophers, Professor Ghulām-Reżā Fayyāzī supports the composition and coexistence of multiple actual forms within one being and, therefore, denies the unity of the human soul. According to him, man possesses two souls: the vegetative soul, which is united with its own faculties (nutrition, growth, etc.), and the human soul, which is united with its own faculties (cognitive and voluntary motor functions). In this study, using a descriptive-analytical method, both the evidence and the content of Professor Fayyāzī’s theory are critically examined. Ultimately, Mullā Ṣadrā’s theory is explicated and accepted. According to Mullā Ṣadrā, the soul, despite its simplicity and unity, possesses degrees of intensity, and it is the very soul itself—in both its stronger and weaker degrees—that serves as the origin of all perceptive and non-perceptive acts. For Mullā Ṣadrā, non-cognitive acts of the soul share an ontological affinity (sinḵiyyah) with the existence of the soul; hence, human nutrition and vegetative nutrition are essentially two different modes of nourishment. In accordance with his theory of the gradational (tashkīkī) relationship between cause and effect, the soul and its faculties are of one and the same reality: when it exists in a more complete and simple manner, it is referred to by the concept “soul,” and when it exists in a more limited and differentiated way, it is referred to by the concept “faculties.” The conclusion is that, according to the doctrine “al-nafs kull
al-quwā” (the soul is the totality of the faculties): first, man possesses only one soul—the rational or human soul—since the existence of multiple souls would result in disorder within the system of human governance; second, the soul is the efficient cause of the faculties, as all philosophers agree; and third, the relationship between cause and effect is gradational (tashkīkī), such that whatever the effect possesses, the cause possesses it in a more complete manner.