نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه و کلام، دانشگاه شیراز، شیراز، ایران
2 دانشیار گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشگاه جهرم،جهرم، ایران
3 استادیار گروه معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه شهید باهنر کرمان، کرمان، ایران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
Logicians, on the one hand, define demonstration (burhān) as a syllogism composed of certain premises that yields a certain conclusion. On the other hand, through the articulation of the criterion of li-mā (demonstration propter quid), the rule of dhawāt al-asbāb (the principle of causes), and the conditions governing the premises of demonstration, they have expanded or restricted its divisions. For instance, by invoking the rule of dhawāt al-asbāb, they have maintained that only the li-mā demonstration yields certainty. The question thus arises: among the various criteria and standards considered by logicians in the division of demonstration, which is more tenable? The author's aim is to examine the factors influencing the classifications of demonstration, addressing the inadequacies of certain criteria—particularly the rule of dhawāt al-asbāb—and then, drawing upon the view of Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1640 CE), to argue, in contrast to other positions, that demonstration should be regarded as an argument with certain premises leading to a certain conclusion, while also contending that non-li-mā demonstrations can, under specific conditions, yield certainty and thus fall within the definition of demonstration.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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